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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its per curiam 
decision that Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, 
which was treated as a motion for reconsideration by the 
trial court, did not toll the time for the filing of an 
appeal subsequent to the trial court's ruling of summary 
judgment. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The unpublished ruling below is designated as 2004 UT 
App 460, case number 20040682 CA. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioners have made their application for certiorari 
pursuant to rules 45 through 49 inclusive of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. As set forth below, Respondents 
herein continue to maintain that Petitioners' failure to 
file a timely notice of appeal subsequent to the trial 
court's ruling of summary judgment, precludes the appellate 
courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See 
also, State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1991) (the 
time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional and ordinarily 
cannot be waived). 
The Utah Supreme Court does not have original 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to either § 78-2-2(1) 
or § 78-2-2(2) of the Utah Code. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has the sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
pursuant to § 78-2-2(5) of the Utah Code. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Aside from the rules and statutes outlined above, no 
constitutional provisions or statutes have direct bearing 
on the issue presented. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The present matter stems from an incident of 
conversion alleged to have occurred in or about May of 1994 
while Petitioners, hereinafter Plaintiffs, employed 
Respondent, hereinafter Defendant. As Plaintiffs have 
informed the Court, this matter resolved itself in the 
criminal arena in 1997 with Defendant entering a guilty 
plea to the charge of theft. Thereafter, Plaintiffs took 
no steps to pursue this matter civilly until May of 2000 at 
which time they filed their action alleging that Defendant 
converted certain items of personal property belonging to 
them and that this conversion amounted to a breach of a 
written contract. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Defendant continued to 
live in the same residence that he had lived during his 
employment with Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs failed to serve 
Defendant with this Complaint and the Third District Court 
ultimately dismissed the matter on or about March 6, 2002. 
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Thereafter, for over ten months subsequent to this 
dismissal, Plaintiffs took no action to pursue this matter 
until January of 2003 when Plaintiffs simply re-filed their 
Complaint from May of 2000 and at that time taking 
advantage of the saving statute to preserve their single 
cause of action. From January 2003 until April of 2003 
Plaintiffs failed to serve Defendant with the Complaint, 
again notwithstanding the fact that Defendant continued to 
reside in his same residence in Salt Lake County. In April 
of 2003, Plaintiffs filed a motion to have the matter 
served by publication. On or about April 29, 2003 the 
Court granted this motion. Thereafter, notwithstanding the 
previous motion, Plaintiffs succeeded in serving Defendant 
at his residence on or May 23, 2003 by mail. 
Defendant, by and through counsel, promptly answered 
the complaint on or about June 5, 2003. Thereafter, in 
November of 2003, Defendant filed his Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the premise that no writing existed to evidence 
any written agreement in which Defendant agreed to hold 
"certain items of personal property" for Plaintiffs. If 
any agreement did exist between the parties relating to 
that personal property then the agreement at best would be 
an oral contract subject to a four-year statute as opposed 
to a six-year limitation period. And because Plaintiffs 
failed to file their complaint within this four-year 
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proscription, Plaintiffs' action should be barred pursuant 
to the statute of limitations. In response to Defendant's 
assertion, Plaintiffs produced a written employment 
contract between the parties. That contract, however, made 
no mention of any agreement m which Defendant agreed to 
hold personal property for Plaintiffs. 
At oral argument in January of 2004, the Court gave 
Plaintiffs an additional sixty days to either find a 
written document evidencing an agreement for the type of 
bailment the Complaint alleged or to find legal authority 
supporting their position that the written employment 
contract could be interpreted so expansively. Plaintiffs 
declined this invitation, and in papers submitted to the 
Court on or about March 5, 2004, Plaintiffs produced no new 
written agreement or substantive legal argument augmenting 
their advocated positions m January. Defendant thus 
renewed his motion for summary judgment. 
Following a second oral argument in April of 2004, the 
trial court issued its memorandum decision filed on May 26, 
2004 granting Defendant summary judgment. Following 
approval of the final order, the order was entered on or 
about June 16, 2004. 
On or about June 9, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their 
motion for reconsideration m which they cited no new case 
law or fact to support their position. The trial court 
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dealt with this motion substantively as a motion for 
reconsideration and then denied this motion on or about 
July 21, 2004. 
On or about August 4, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their 
notice of appeal. Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2004, 
Defendant filed his motion for summary disposition on the 
ground that Plaintiffs' notice was untimely filed. On 
September 1, 2004, the Court of Appeals, apparently unaware 
of Defendant's pending motion, filed its sua sponte order 
to the parties to brief the issue of timeliness pursuant to 
the rules afforded summary dispositions. Following the 
briefing period, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs' motion 
could only be treated as a motion for reconsideration. The 
court then stated that insofar as a motion for 
reconsideration did not fall within the rules of civil 
procedure, the filing of such motion did not toll the 
period from which a notice of appeal must be filed. The 




A motion to reconsider does not toll the time from 
which an appeal must be taken. 
Plaintiffs argue here, as they did below, that 
notwithstanding the caption of their motion to reconsider, 
that the timely filing of their post-trial motion tolled 
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the thirty day period from which they could file a timely 
notice of appeal. Plaintiffs have made this argument in 
bad faith and Defendant is entitled to his attorneys' fees 
and costs that he has incurred in defending this 
increasingly spurious course that Plaintiffs have chosen to 
continue to pursue. As Defendant argued below, and as case 
law repeatedly states—most recently the Court of Appeals in 
its per curiam decision below—a motion to reconsider does 
not toll the time from which a notice of appeal must be 
filed. And notwithstanding Plaintiffs' phrasing of the 
issues, the Court of Appeals' decision neither conflicts 
with other decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals nor 
with a decision handed down by this Court. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs' petition should be denied and Defendant awarded 
his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in responding to 
this writ.% 
Pursuant to Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, motions under the rules of civil procedure made 
pursuant to Rule 50(b) (motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict); Rule 52(b) (amendment of findings to comport 
with the evidence following trial); Rule 59 (amendment of 
judgment following trial) toll the time from which a timely 
notice of appeal must be filed. Motions beyond the rules 
do not toll such time. Salt Lake Knee and Sports 
Rehabilitation v. Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine, 
7 
909 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1995). Amotion for 
reconsideration is not sanctioned by the rules of civil 
procedure and therefore does not toll the time to file a 
notice of appeal. Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 676 (Utah 1980); 
Ron Shepard Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 
1990). 
In the present case, insofar as Plaintiffs failed to 
file their notice of appeaL within 30 days subsequent to 
the trial court's order, Plaintiffs are left with the task 
of attempting to characterize their motion to reconsider as 
something else in order to preserve an avenue for appeal. 
This is a frivolous task. 
For Plaintiffs to characterize their motion as 
something other than a motion to reconsider for purposes of 
tolling the time for an appeal, Plaintiffs would have to 
show why their motion to reconsider should treated as a 
Rule 59 motion. To meet this burden, Plaintiffs would have 
to explain more than just a supposed mistake in the 
caption. Plaintiffs would also have to explain why the 
body of their motion bears no resemblance to a Rale 59 
motion and why the memorandum bears no resemblance to a 
Rule 59 memorandum. Moreover, they would have to explain 
why they filed such motion beyond the parameters 
established by Rule 59(b). Obviously they cannot meet this 
burden. 
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Although the caption for a motion may not definitively 
establish what motion lies beneath, it certainly provides 
an initial point of inquiry. In this case, Plaintiffs 
captioned their motion "Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration [Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment]". 
Thus, at least at the point of initial inquiry, the motion 
would appear to be nothing more than a simple motion to 
reconsider. 
The body of the motion itself would seem to confirm 
this suggestion. The first paragraph of the motion states: 
"The Plaintiffs David K Gillett and Majestic Air Services 
move this Court to reconsider its decision concerning the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment." Noticeably 
absent from this paragraph is any reference to Rule 59. 
Also absent are the words "amend" or "alter", two words one 
would expect to find in a Rule 59 motion. The second 
paragraph of the motion also omits reference to Rule 59 or 
Rule 59 watchwords and merely instead states that the 
factual and legal basis for the motion will be more fully 
described in the accompanying memorandum. Thus, 
notwithstanding Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, 
nothing in the body of the motion would suggest that 
Plaintiffs simply mistakenly captioned their motion or that 
the motion was anything other than a simple motion to 
reconsider. 
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Likewise, the memorandum itself does not assist 
Plaintiffs in their task of characterizing the motion as 
one made pursuant to Rule 59. Nowhere in the body of the 
memorandum or elsewhere do Plaintiffs cite case law to 
suggest that they intended the motion to function as a Rule 
59 motion. Rather, the cited case law focuses on issues 
related solely to Rule 56, and the cited arguments are 
nothing but the same arguments that Plaintiffs had advanced 
twice before. Nowhere in the memorandum do Plaintiffs 
suggest that the relief they seek is being made pursuant to 
Rule 59. Not once in the memorandum do Plaintiffs use the 
words "amend" or "alter". Given these absences the trial 
court would have been hard pressed to conclude that 
Plaintiffs were making their motion pursuant to Rule 59. 
And it did not. It instead concluded that Plaintiffs' 
motion was nothing but a motion to reconsider, as did the 
Court of Appeals. 
The timing of the motion also belies Plaintiffs' 
argument that their motion to reconsider was actually a 
motion to alter or amend judgment. Rule 59(b) anticipates 
that Rule 59 motions would be served subsequent to the 
entry of the judgment. In this case Plaintiffs filed their 
motion prior to the entry of judgment, complicating the 
task of amending or altering a judgment that had not yet 
been entered. Faced with this timing the trial court 
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reasonably concluded that Plaintiffs' motion was not a Rule 
59 motion but instead a motion to reconsider before the 
court entered judgment. 
While Plaintiffs cite Watkiss ^Campbell v. Foa £Son, 
808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991) as authority in their favor, the 
factual differences between the two cases bar that 
comparison. Specifically, in Watkiss, the trial court 
looked beyond the caption to the substance of the motion to 
treat the motion as a motion for a new trial that would 
toll the time from running. As set forth above, the trial 
court in this case did not treat Plaintiffs' motion as a 
rule 59 motion. This fundamental difference distinguishes 
Watkiss and prevents Plaintiffs from making the contrary 
assertion. Rather, as both the trial court and Court of 
Appeals concluded, Plaintiffs' motion was nothing but a 
motion to reconsider that did not toll the time from which 
an appeal must be taken, and Defendant urges this Court to 
conclude likewise. 
II. 
Defendant should be awarded his costs and attorneys' 
fees incurred in opposing this writ. 
Rules 33(a) and 34(b) provide that if the Court 
concludes that an appeal or motion is either frivolous or 
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for delay, that it shall award such damages as are just 
including attorneys' fees and costs. Under these rules, a 
frivolous appeal is one not grounded in fact, not warranted 
in law, nor based on a good faith argument to either modify 
or reverse existing law. The instant case warrants such 
award. 
Writs for certiorari are governed by Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In Plaintiffs' 
application for this writ, Plaintiff urges the Court to 
grant certiorari, on three grounds pursuant to this rule. 
First, that the Court of Appeals' decision is in conflict 
with a decision rendered by another panel of the Court of 
Appeals. Second, that the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state law in a way that conflicts with a ruling 
from this Court. And third, that the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that so far departs from accepted and 
proceedings that this Court must intervene. Plaintiffs' 
Brief, p.3. As set forth above, not only have Plaintiffs 
failed to establish the lower court's err, they have 
indulged a frivolous argument beyond their right. 
Rule 46(a) states in the very first sentence that 
"review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right." 
Rather it is based on the Court's discretion within certain 
enumerated considerations. However, simply because 
Plaintiffs have recited these enumerated considerations 
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does not mean that they have established arguments to meet 
these requirements. And indeed they have not. 
With respect to the first argument, Plaintiffs cite 
Salt Lake Knee , supra, and Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah App. 1994) as evidence that 
the lower court rendered a decision in conflict with 
another Court of Appeals decision. That argument lacks 
merit entirely. First, Trembly has nothing at all to do 
with the issue at bar as to whether a motion, treated as a 
motion to reconsider by the trial court, will toll the time 
from which an appeal must be taken. Indeed, Plaintiffs 
only cite footnote #2 from this case in their brief, for 
the proposition that substance triumphs over form. That 
proposition is not an issue nor is it disputed. But to the 
degree this footnote is relevant to the issue at bar, it 
support's the proposition that an appellate court will look 
past a motion's form to determine how the trial court dealt 
with the issue substantively and then give deference to the 
trial court's treatment. Thus, in Trembly the appellate 
court simply looked past the Rule 60(b)(7) caption to 
determine that the trial court had actually treated the 
motion as a Rule 54(b) motion notwithstanding the motion's 
form and then reviewed the trial court's decision 
accordingly. This statement in no way supports Plaintiffs' 
argument because this is exactly what the Court of Appeals 
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did in the instant case: it gave deference to the trial 
court's treatment and it reviewed that treatment 
accordingly. And that review concluded that a motion to 
reconsider does not toll the time from an appeal must be 
taken. 
The same situation presents itself in Salt Lake Knee. 
In that case the Court of Appeals noted that 
notwithstanding the caption of the motion for a new trial, 
that the trial court had treated the motion for 
reconsideration substantively as a Rule 59 motion. The 
Court of Appeals gave deference to that treatment and then 
reviewed that treatment as such. Again, that is exactly 
what the court below did in this case. The Court of 
Appeals gave deference to the trial court's treatment of 
the motion, and such deference can hardly be construed as a 
departure from the panels in Trembly and Salt Lake Knee 
sufficient to warrant this writ. 
The same is true of Plaintiffs' second argument that 
the court below rendered a decision that conflicts with a 
holding from this Court. Plaintiffs cite Gallardo v. 
Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah (1990); and Watkiss, supra, as 
evidence of this conflict. Again, however, an examination 
of these cases reveals no such conflict. Like the cases 
examined above, both of these cases deal with motions 
brought before the trial court bearing the captions "motion 
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to reconsider". Notwithstanding those captions, the trial 
courts looked beyond the motions' title to address the 
substance of the motion as something other than a motion to 
reconsider. In Gallardo the trial court dealt with the 
motion substantively as if it were a motion for relief from 
judgment, and in Watkiss, the trial court dealt with the 
motion as if it were a motion for a new trial. Because the 
trial court dealt with these motions based on their 
substance as opposed to their form, this Court gave 
deference to that treatment and determined that such 
motions would toll the time from which an appeal must be 
taken. Again, the court below did exactly that and their 
decision in no way departs from the rulings in this case. 
The trial court determined, as set forth above, that 
Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider was simply that, a motion 
to reconsider. Neither the motion nor the accompanying 
memorandum made any reference to any rule of civil 
procedure other than Rule 56, and the memorandum offered 
nothing new and simply repeated the same arguments that had 
failed twice before. Thus, the trial court determined, 
without abusing its discretion, that Plaintiffs' motion was 
an unsanctioned motion under the rules of civil procedure 
and it treated the motion that way substantively. The 
court below then determined that because Plaintiffs' motion 
failed to substantively comply with any motion which might 
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otherwise toll the time at issue, that the time from which 
an appeal must be taken began running on June 16, 2004. 
Because Plaintiffs did not file their notice of appeal 
until August 4, 2004, that notice was untimely under the 
rules. This ruling does not depart from this Court's 
holdings to justify the present writ under Rule 46. 
Plaintiffs' third argument, that the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that so far departs from accepted 
conduct barely warrants comment, and quotations within 
Plaintiffs' own brief would apparently belie this 
assertion. At page 12 of Plaintiffs' brief, Plaintiffs 
cite Salt Lake Knee: "It is by how well established that 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a 
xmotion for reconsideration' of a trial court's ruling." 
The panel below in its ruling obviously did not depart from 
this statement. Nor did it depart from any other holding 
set forth by an appellate court in this state. Plaintiffs' 
statement to the contrary is both frivolous and in bad 
faith and to the extent this frivolity forces Defendant to 
continue to incur attorney's fees, Plaintiffs should be 
sanctioned accordingly as set forth in the accompanying 
affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to uphold the ruling below 
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that Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider did not toll the time 
from which a notice of appeal must be filed. And that 
since Plaintiffs failed to file their notice within thirty 
days from the entry of judgment, Plaintiffs' notice was 
untimely to the effect to deny appellate jurisdiction. 
Moreover, because Plaintiffs failed to establish that the 
Court of Appeals ruling departed from another appellate 
holding and failed to make good faith arguments to warrant 
the modification of existing law, Defendant urges this 
Court to sanction Plaintiffs as urged in the accompanying 
affidavits. 
DATED this X ^ day of July, 2005. 
COOK, SKEEN & ROBINSON 
-v RANDAlii -LT-'"SKEEN 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellee 
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The foregoing Reply Brief was mailed to Stephen G. 
Homer at 9225 South Redwood Road, West Jordan, Utah 84088, 
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